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Introduction 
The study of information exchange in globally distributed work (GDW) has taken interest in how 
information can be shared efficiently and securely (Levina & Vaast 2008; Leonardi & Bailey 2008). To 
complete GDW, information about their individual tasks is shared across complex organizational and 
geographic distances (Levina & Vaast 2008; Leonardi & Bailey 2008). Prior research has established that 
information users need timely access to important task-related information but face challenges receiving 
information across time differences, knowledge distances, and often complex information systems 
(Leonardi & Bailey 2008). Prior research has also established that those managing information need to 
secure the quality and accuracy of information but face challenges when they interact with multiple, 
distributed, senders, users, and receivers who often have different information needs (Leonardi et al 2016).   
One solution that has received growing attention is the use of intermediaries to broker information (Boari 
& Riboldazzi 2014; Soderberg & Romani 2017; Quintane & Carnabuci 2016). Intermediaries connect 
information between multiple users that would otherwise be disconnected (Leonardi & Bailey 2013). For 
instance, intermediaries mediate to make information visible, easily accessed, and understandable (Currie 
& White 2012; Pawlowski & Robey 2004). Intermediaries use their position to find and share good ideas 
(Leonardi & Bailey 2013; 2017). Intermediaries are also useful tools for overcoming cultural or professional 
differences and encourage trust and information sharing (Newell et al. 2007; Soderberg & Romani 2017). 
At the same time, intermediaries protect information being transmitted and received (Mehta & Bharadwaj 
2015). For instance, intermediaries buffer communication to reduce unwanted distractions or information 
overload (Mehta & Bharadwaj 2015). Intermediaries filter information to minimize transfer of inaccurate 
information (Mehta & Bharadwaj 2015). Intermediaries are also useful mechanism for stopping 
unauthorized access to information and protecting against external entities from accessing valuable 
intellectual property (Mehta & Bharadwaj 2015; Pawlowski & Robey).   
However, for intermediaries to effectively broker information, exchanges need to remain visible. While in 
theory, all information exchanges are mediated (Mehta & Bharadwaj 2015), controlled through legal 
contracts (Gopal & Gosain 2010), and supported by information technology (Leonardi & Bailey 2008; Oshri 
2008), in practice information exchanges often happen outside of formal systems. For instance, the instinct 
of information users can be to find shorter, easier ways to get work done by going straight to the source 
(Cram & Gallupe 2016). Despite this, existing research has paid little attention to the challenges 
intermediaries face when information is not visible or how, in practice, intermediaries broker information 
effectively. Drawing on a qualitative case study in a globally distributed finance function we use a 
workarounds approach (Davison & Ou 2013; Malaurent & Avison 2016) to show how the intermediary 
shared service unit (SSU) broker information when they become aware of information exchanges that are 
in violation of formal procedures. Information workarounds for straightforward queries were quicker, 
easier and resulted in more efficient resolutions. However, problems and errors were hidden from the 
intermediary resulting in process inefficiencies and risks to information security. It is within this context 
that we seek to shed light on how brokers broker information when information is invisible to them. 
Our paper makes significant theoretical contribution to information exchange literature by drawing 
attention to information visibility. Prior exchange literature has often taken for granted the ability of 
intermediaries to find and access information (e.g. Ancona & Caldwell 1992). Consequently, research has 
not fully understood the challenges intermediaries face brokering information when information is 
invisible. Our workarounds approach addresses this important gap in our understanding and shows how 
intermediaries broker information across complex, distributed settings (Leonardi et al 2016; Mehta & 
Bharadwaj 2015) that create conditions to distort and hide information. We draw on data from two groups: 
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those sharing and receiving information, and those mediating it to explain how, in practice, intermediaries 
have to negotiate information visibility and make allowances for how information is exchanged. 
Our workarounds approach, also contributes to a small but growing body of research which aims to 
understand how brokers broker (see Quintane & Carnabuci 2016 for a call to research). In line with existing 
research we confirm that brokers play two integral roles: connecting information and protecting 
information (Mehta & Bharadwaj 2015). However, in light of workarounds, we find a new, third role: 
regulating information. Our research suggests that intermediaries are often not able to perform both roles 
simultaneously, as prior literature has set out, and instead have to make decisions about when to connect 
and when to protect information. Our complimentary third role builds on current understanding of how 
intermediaries broker information under complex or ambiguous circumstances which demand a more 
flexible approach to brokering.   
Our paper also shows the normative complexity of workarounds. Workarounds are often perceived as 
negatively affecting the integrity and security of information (Azad & King 2011) or positively affecting the 
flow of information (Cram & Gallupe 2016). However, our case demonstrates the wide range of effects 
workarounds have, ranging from encouraging creativity and problem-solving, to hiding information, as well 
as, helping to mediate the flow of information between teams. We find workarounds are neither positive 
nor negative but are negotiated to allow for complexity in distributed work settings. We also provide 
insights for those managing SSU and similar intermediary units by suggesting how one unit balances the 
competing demands of connection and protection by regulating information and provide examples of 
specific regulatory behaviors.  
Globally distributed work and information brokering 
Information exchange can be practically complex, highly politicized, and hard to manage. Prior research 
has identified numerous specific challenges organizations face exchanging information across globally 
distributed and diverse teams (GDW) (Levina & Vaast 2008; Oshri et al 2008). For instance, geographic 
distances have been found to reduce the frequency, quality and convenience of information exchanges and 
make sharing information and ideas more challenging (Levina & Vaast 2008). To give a practical example, 
a team in New York, USA may need information from a team performing work in Bangalore, India. 
However, teams are subject to delays due to the working hours of a team in Bangalore, who are 9.5 hours 
ahead of New York. Further, teams are also expected to use formal systems for exchanging information 
which may require paperwork to be completed before they are able to send or receive information. Research 
has found that practically, sharing information can be cumbersome and slow (Cram & Gallupe 2016). 
Different knowledge bases, derived from doing different work, has also been found to create challenges for 
exchanging information (Kotlarsky et al 2014; Leonardi & Bailey 2013). For instance, research suggests that 
teams need common understanding, such as shared language, lexicon and perspective, to collaborate 
effectively (Levina & Vaast 2008), benefit from each other’s knowledge, or jointly problem solve (Jarvenpaa 
& Majchrzak 2016). Research also suggest that organizational boundaries, that is the structural divides 
between one team and another, create challenges for exchanging information (Levina & Vaast 2008). For 
instance, research suggests that teams are often concerned with the opportunistic behavior of ‘outsiders’, 
risks to intellectual property where it is difficult to determine “who owns the code” (Chen, Bharadwaj & Goh 
2017), and sharing information that may help to make their own jobs redundant (Ravishankar & 
Zimmerman 2014). Often this protective behavior results in hiding information (Ravishankar & 
Zimmerman 2014).  
It is not surprising then that organizations have turned to intermediaries to broker information. Brokering 
is the management of knowledge (Currie & White 2012), information (Leonardi & Bailey 2013), or ideas 
(Leonardi & Bailey 2013) across otherwise disconnected groups (Burt 1992). Brokering has been studied by 
scholars across disciplines, with particular prevalence in Organization, Management Studies and 
Information Systems research, to understand how information can be mobilized and received by different 
groups across an organization. More recently, information brokering has gained attention in the context of 
GDW: including offshore software development (Mehta and Bharadwaj 2015; Soderberg & Romani 2017) 
and offshore digital engineering services (Leonardi & Bailey 2013). For instance, in a study of offshore 
software development Mehta and Bharadwaj (2015) draw attention to the additional complexity of GDW 
and find that protective roles (that of the sentry and guard) in particular are often more important in 
outsourcing scenarios due to the multiple organizational boundaries.  
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Most recently, studies have drawn attention to the increasing complexity of information exchange in GDW. 
Studies from both industry and practice agree that organizations are distributing more work and that the 
work they are distributing is more complex and knowledge intensive (KPMG 2014; Oshri et al. 2015; 
Soderberg & Romani 2017; Leonardi 2017). Consequently, brokers are becoming an increasingly important 
facet of information exchange. Interestingly, while broker teams are traditionally employed by 
organizations, recent studies find that brokers also emerge from existing teams. For instance, in the 
offshoring context, Leonardi (2017) finds that offshore teams, who had been considered “low-status” and 
who had been performing “low-value work”, were increasingly becoming centers of innovation. In his 
insightful paper, Leonardi shows how these “low-status” teams, took the opportunity to broker information 
and sell ideas to create value for the organization. Specifically, the study suggests that these teams made 
“connections between, and combinations of, ideas that result in new products, processes, or services” 
(p.118). While the paper makes significant strides into understanding the positional advantage (mediating 
interactions with multiple teams) and status disadvantage of these offshoring teams there is more to 
understand about how, in practice, teams are able to broker information under these circumstances. 
Information workarounds  
Clearly, in order for intermediary units to be effective brokers it is imperative that they are aware of the 
information exchange. A big challenge intermediaries face, in brokering information, is when information 
is exchanged directly. On one hand, direct communication allows some queries to be dealt with more 
quickly and efficiently. However, ongoing information exchanges between teams can cause backchannels 
to open up and information to become invisible to the intermediary. One unintended consequence of these 
back-channels is that the intermediary is not able to protect the integrity or flow of information. Drawing 
on the notion of ‘workarounds’ (Davison & Ou 2013; Ferneley & Sobreperez 2006), we define information 
workarounds as information exchanges without official sanction.  
Workarounds are a deliberate act of non-compliance with official policy (Alter 2014) in order to overcome 
real or perceived obstacles to workflow (Davison & Ou 2013; Malaurent & Avison 2016). In order to work 
around obstacles, individuals or groups diverge from formal procedures or systems put in place to manage 
and control processes (Ignatiadis & Nandhakumar 2009). The detrimental and unintended consequences 
of workarounds have been widely explored (Alter 2014; Azad & King 2011; Ferneley & Sobreperez 2006). 
Broadly, this group of studies has shown how workarounds lead to low adoption rates, threaten information 
security, misaligned system objectives, impact subsequent activities, and reduce returns on investment. For 
instance, research has found that workarounds increase the risks to information security. In a study 
focusing on ERP implementation Boudreau and Robey (2005) find employees worked around a desktop 
automatic ‘log-off’ security feature by asking other employees to ‘click’ on their screens to save time. 
However, as authors suggest, these avoidant actions bypass important security features which risk 
information integrity, have legal implications, and risk patient safety (Azad & King 2008). Studies have also 
demonstrated how workarounds can encourage user resistance by providing an alternative to formal 
systems and new technologies (Boudreau & Robey 2005). A key issue with workarounds GDW is that they 
become invisible to intermediaries. It stands to reason that workarounds are often hidden from 
management making them difficult to identify (Alter 2014). Instead, workarounds hide errors or 
inefficiencies that should otherwise be flagged and corrected (Gasparas & Monteiro 2009). Consequently, 
problems with formal systems and processes often go unnoticed until more severe problems emerge 
(Gasparas & Monteiro 2009).  
Only recently, research has begun to explore the advantages of workarounds (Cram & Gallupe 2016; 
Malaurent & Avison 2016). The most immediate advantage being that they assist the continuation of work 
and can reduce bottleneck effect on subsequent activities (Ferneley & Sobreperez 2006; Cram & Gallupe 
2016). For instance, Ferneley and Sobreperez suggest that workarounds compensate for flaws in existing 
systems by creating ‘idiosyncratic methods of data collection, data management or working practice, in 
effect ensuring essential task completion” (2006 p. 347). If they can be identified, workarounds also signal 
obstacles in formal work practices that need to be overcome. For instance, workarounds have been found 
to signal a poor user functionality and over-complicated processes (Cram & Gallupe 2016). In GDW, the 
use of intermediation and formal systems, designed to ease information sharing, are often deemed 
bureaucratic and cumbersome (Cram & Gallupe 2016) and may signal an opportunity to improve 
information exchange. Further, workarounds, by nature, point to an alternative, quicker, if not more 
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efficient, way of getting things done (Ferneley and Sobreperez 2006; Safadi & Faraj 2010). In this respect, 
workarounds may be a source of creativity or innovation (Boudreau et al 2016). Literature supports the 
notion that “hacks and workarounds are the soul of innovation” as they invite creative solutions from 
ground level beyond top down directives (Norman 2008 p.48). Consequently, workarounds often become 
adopted as formal, or recognized informal practice (Safadi & Faraj 2010). Despite the potential benefits, 
research suggests that organizations go to great lengths to reduce existing workarounds and discourage 
them from emerging (Ignatiadis & Nandhakumar 2009; Rivard & Lapointe 2012). As Rivard & Lapointe 
note, there is sparse literature that focuses on the implementers and their response to “dysfunctional” 
workarounds once they have become routinized (2012 p.898). As organizational complexity increases 
workarounds become part of how information is exchanged. It is often not possible or useful to eradicate 
short-cuts and therefore it becomes increasingly important to understand how to manage them. In the 
following sections we present a case of an intermediary financial shared service unit (SSU), examining how 
the intermediaries broker information when distributed teams exchange information that is invisible to 
them.   
Design and case selection 
Rationale 
Given our intention to better understand the specific challenges intermediary teams face when brokering 
information across multiple boundaries we adopted qualitative case study methods (Klein & Myers 1999). 
Qualitative case study methods are a particularly useful tool for exploratory research and helps to advance 
understanding of complex issues in a real-life context (Eisenhardt 1989; Kotlarsky et al. 2014). Case study 
methods also enabled us to triangulate interview with more objective data such as internal documentation 
(Yin 2003). We took an interpretivist approach to data analysis and have reported data that emerged 
organically from a broader case study on globally distributed teams, change and challenges.   
Case Background 
Our research is set in a large global logistics firm who employ over 490,000 people in 220 countries 
worldwide. The firm is divided into four main business divisions run for the most part as individual 
organizations governed by their own management teams. Each division operates from country level 
business units which provide logistic services to a range of business (b2b) and individual customers (b2c). 
In 2008 the firm’s largest business division took the decision to move some financial operations out of the 
finance teams in the country business unit (BU) and into a newly created financial shared service unit (SSU). 
The aim of the SSU was to focus on performing the financial processes more efficiently from one location 
at a reduced cost. As a result, the SSU was tasked with providing a range of financial operations, including 
Purchase-to-Pay, Record-to-Report, Order-to-Cash, and General Ledger, back to the business unit finance 
teams (BU) across Europe (on which this research focuses), as well as, Asia and the Americas. In addition, 
the SSU were tasked with improving financial processes through standardization, integrating systems, 
implementing new tools to 
improve the transparency and 
efficiency of information 
exchange across the 
organization. The aim of the 
BUs, who had previously 
performed the financial 
operations, was to focus on 
alternative financial activities. 
BUs typically consisted of a 
CFO and small financial 
controlling team (between 3-8 
people) who were responsible 
for country level financial 
planning and reporting. The 
BU teams were expected to 
spend more time responding 
Figure 1. Structure of Finance Organization 
CTT 
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to requests for financial information from regional and global finance teams. BU teams were often required 
to provide financial reports used for division and firm level forecasting and audits to meet legal 
requirements. They also helped the operations and sales teams, within the business unit, to improve their 
financial position and improve end customer experience with financial services. Figure 1 shows the 
structure of the finance organization and the distribution of work amongst teams.  
In 2011 the SSU outsourced accounts payable activities, from the Purchase-to-Pay process, to a third-party 
vendor in Bangalore (vendor). Accounts payable involves processing invoices which are received from the 
business’ suppliers (e.g. a utility firm who has provided power to the office). Invoices are sent by the 
business’ suppliers to the vendor who input the invoice into a payment system and initiate the payment. 
The payment is then made to the supplier and recorded for financial documentation and reporting. The aim 
was for the SSU to further reduce the cost of finance and free up internal SSU resources for process 
improvement and standardization projects. However, the SSU team then also had to manage the third-
party vendor. In order to do this effectively, the SSU team developed a small team, known as the ‘control 
tower team’ (CTT), within the SSU, to mediate information exchanged between BUs and the vendor. We 
focus on how the intermediary SSU (including the control tower) brokered information. See Table 1 for 
definitions of the financial processes and finance teams. 
Table 1. Financial Terms and Finance Teams 
Teams and Terms Explanation 
Business Unit 
Finance (BU) 
Finance team who sit within individual country level business units. The team, 
usually consisting of a CFO and a team of 2-8 people, are responsible for financial 
planning, reporting, and audits (legal requirement) for their country business unit. 
Shared Service 
Unit (SSU) 
Financial operations team who sit within a centralised unit in Europe. The team 
perform several financial processes and deliver them back to BU teams or directly 
to the Business’ suppliers. 
Control tower 
(CTT) 
Controlling team which sits within the SSU. The team was created to manage the 
vendor and to interface with BU teams for delivery of accounts payable activities. 
Vendor 
Third-party vendor based in India. The team perform and deliver accounts payable 
activities for the SSU. This activity results in the payment of business supplier 
invoices and allocation (charge) to BU financial statements (e.g. profit and loss). 
Business’ 
Suppliers 
Firms or individuals who provide goods or services to the firm who require 
payment. These payments are usually financially allocated (charged) to individual 
country level business units. For example, utility companies, or other logistics firms. 
Purchase-to-pay 
A business process that involves purchasing and paying for a good or service. 
Activities include: purchasing/ordering a good or service, receiving it, paying for it, 
and then accounting for it. 
Order-to-cash 
A business process that involves receiving and fulfilling customer orders. Activities 
include: receiving customer order for a good or service, documenting the order, 
fulfilling the order, shipping or performing the order, creating and sending an 
invoice, receiving payment and then recording payment in the general ledger. 
General ledger 
A set of accounting records held by a firm. The ledger contains records of all 
financial transactions that are used to prepare (legally required) financial 
statements such as cash flow, income statements and balance sheets. 
Accounts Payable 
A short-term debt payment activity. Accounts payable are money owed by a 
business to its suppliers. These are recorded in a sub-ledger when an invoice is 
produced and cleared why accounts are paid. 
Key Performance 
Indicators  
A measure used to evaluate the performance of teams against pre-defined targets. 
These targets are usually tied to contractual obligations or bonuses. 
Service Level 
Agreements  
A contract between a user and a service provider that defines the expected service 
and any conditions or parameters. 
Standard 
Operating 
Procedures  
A set of (usually step-by-step) instructions which prescribe how an activity is 
performed. SOPs are used to codify knowledge, reduce miscommunication, increase 
efficiencies and reduce mistakes. 
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Fieldwork 
In total we conducted 26 interviews. All interviews were face-to-face, except three, which were via 
teleconference. Each interview lasted between 60 and 140 minutes and, with the permission of our 
informants, all interviews were audio-recorded and later transcribed verbatim. In addition, we collected 
and analyzed internal documentation including annual reports, internal communications, performance 
dashboards, employee opinion surveys, and employee development schemes. We used documentation to 
better understand the structural organization, the distribution of work across teams within the 
organization, how information flows and more specific examples of how and when teams communicate. We 
also took the opportunity to spend some time in the offices talking informally with various informants, as 
well as, capturing photographs of the offices and working environment.  
As illustrated in Table 2, data was collected and analyzed in three rounds between 2015-2016. The first 
round of interviews were conducted with SSU members in their Netherlands based head office. With the 
help of an SSU manager we selected interviewees from a range of management positions. The interviews 
were semi-structured around the distribution of work across the finance function, as well as, the challenges 
that informants faced in their work and collaborating with one-another. Informants were asked to elaborate 
or give examples of ‘how’ and ‘why’ they think situations or events occurred, as well as, how they managed 
them. The intention was to let interesting themes emerge (Walsham 1995; 2006) from this first round of 
data collection whilst beginning to understand interactions, workflow, and challenges of GDW. We 
transcribed all interviews from the first round of interviews, studied the data, and made extensive notes to 
identify emerging themes of each interview individually. We then combined the interview data with 
documentation and field notes which helped us to map organizational structure, reporting lines, workflow 
and responsibilities, as well as, understand different group objectives (using KPI information and 
performance metrics). With this we set about identifying common themes across the first round of 
interviews. The notion of information control and information bypassing the intermediary unit emerged 
organically from the data across all interviews. The majority of interviews referred to the direct exchange of 
information between the BUs and vendor teams in detail and how it had impacted on the informant’s role. 
The second round of interviews also took place at the SSU head office. Interviewees included additional 
SSU managers and managers from the firm’s finance department. The second round of semi-structured 
interviews were designed to confirm and further explore the challenges SSU informants faced and better 
understand how they manage them. If information bypassing did not emerge organically from interviews 
then we asked informants if they were aware if teams communicated directly with one-another, why this 
might be, and how useful this was for them. However, we were conscious of asking specific questions and 
took care not to lead the informants. We transcribed all interviews from the second round, studied the data, 
and made extensive notes to support or evolve emergent themes, and made extensive notes on new ones. 
The third round of interviews were conducted with CFO’s and their immediate teams from four different 
BUs (UK, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands). The primary purpose of these interviews was to 
understand how BU members experience and cope with challenges in their own work, and in collaborative 
projects. BU members were asked to describe their relationship with the vendor team and the nature of 
their communication. If BU members had communicated directly with the vendor team informants were 
encouraged to elaborate on why and what the outcomes had been. Again, we transcribed all interviews, 
studied the data, and made extensive notes to support or evolve emergent themes, and made extensive notes 
on new ones. 
Table 2. Purpose and outcomes of data collection rounds  
Round Informants Interviews Primary Purpose Outcome 
1 
SSU 
members 
9 
To understand the global 
organisation of the finance 
functions, changes to the role of the 
SSU, and challenges they face 
Notion of information 
workarounds emerged. 
Sense of frustration from 
SSU members. 
2 
SSU and 
Firm 
Finance 
8 
To better understand the challenges 
the SSU face in their own work, and 
in collaborative projects. 
To understand how SSU members 
cope with challenges. 
Workarounds explored. 
Developed understanding of 
how information exchange is 
managed. 
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Data Analysis   
In line with Eisenhardt (1989) we analyzed empirical data through an iterative process of studying emergent 
findings and theoretical concepts. As described above, this process began directly after each interview. We 
made notes about emergent themes, how they related to other themes, and how they compared with 
theoretical concepts we were interested in. We also followed this same process after each round of data 
collection. As we were interested in the differences between teams (structural position and assigned work) 
we also paid attention to the differences and similarities between informant groups – BU and SSU 
interviews. Finally, with a complete set of empirical data we conducted a systematic analysis, loosely coding 
first order themes before returning to theory for guidance. For instance, we made extensive notes on all 
data referring to information exchanges, information bypassing, motivations, consequences, and how they 
were managed or resolved and created a table organizing them by theme (Strauss & Corbin 1998). SSU 
interviews in particular referred to important roles or behaviors they engaged in to mediate information 
exchanges. From the table we coded these mediation activities into second-order interpretive concepts: 
protecting, connecting, adapting or being pragmatic. Having tentatively selected second order themes we 
referred backwards and forwards to theory and the data to help us to understand and explain them. We 
focused on themes identified in the literature as key tensions such as distances in distributed work, 
challenges of managing information across distance, as well as, spanning and brokering strategies. While 
brokering literature helped to explain notions of protecting information and connecting discrete teams the 
third concept did not seem to be covered by existing literature. We revisited summaries and quotes before 
the third theme of ‘regulating’ emerged and no other modifications to the thematic coding was deemed 
necessary. Broad thematic coding and sub-coding were undertaken in Nvivo 10. For the purpose of 
confidentiality, when reporting data, informants will be referred to in groups: SSU informant (including the 
control tower team) and BU informant. 
Case Analysis 
In the following sections we show the challenges the SSU faced brokering information across BU and vendor 
teams who workaround formal communication channels and exchange information directly. To broker 
information, the SSU team played three main roles – Protector, Connector and Regulator. The SSU team 
described limiting direct communication exchanges to make sure information was secure and, at the same 
time, allowing direct communication exchanges to make information readily available. We found that SSU 
teams adapted their behavior based on interpretations of how important information was, and their ability 
to protect or connect information. The SSU team were also reflective about the specific resources they 
needed to be able to regulate information. 
How brokers connect information 
BU and vendor teams communicated directly, via telephone or email, in order to give or gain specific 
information that was not readily available to them. These exchanges bypassed formal communication 
channels, such as standardized forms and systems, put place by the SSU to mediate information. According 
to informants, BU and vendor teams worked around formal systems in order to get specific information 
they needed that was not otherwise available to them. For instance, BU teams contacted vendor teams to 
understand why invoices had not been paid or when the payment would be made to their suppliers. BU 
informants also suggested that they often needed to access information more quickly than formal routes 
would allow. For instance, BU teams described how their suppliers often rang the BU to complain that their 
invoice had not been paid. If the BU did not resolve payment issues quickly and effectively then suppliers 
escalated complaints to BU management or, more drastically, stopped providing their services. One BU 
informant suggested that this had once been the case with an energy firm who had threatened to cut power 
to the business.  
3 
BU 
members 
9 
To understand how BU members 
experience and cope with 
challenges in their own work, and in 
collaborative projects. 
Workarounds explored. 
Developed understanding of 
why workarounds emerged. 
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If I have an urgent escalation, basically a subcontractor hasn’t been paid for whatever reason 
and is escalating and threatening to stop the service, then I’m not going to wait for somebody in 
SSU to pick it up. It needs to go fast.  I’ll pick up the phone or send an email to get a prompt 
response. (BU Informant). 
Vendor teams often contacted BU teams, or their suppliers, directly when information was missing from 
invoices. In order for vendor teams to process invoices they required a specific set of information such as 
purchase date, supplier name and details, and type of purchase. However, different BUs (and their 
suppliers) often had their own ways of working which were not captured in formal instructions. Some 
invoices were handwritten by ‘one man’ delivery drivers and some sent electronically from large utility 
companies. Invoices came in different languages and were also sent in to the SSU through different methods 
– post, email, or online. As a result, vendor teams often needed clarifications or additional information to 
finish processing an invoice.  
The SSU were aware that some BUs and the vendor “don’t play the game” (SSU informant) and 
communicate directly. However, SSU teams also felt that some direct information exchanges were 
inevitable. SSU team described that they did not perform the accounts payable activities themselves and 
therefore did not understand enough about specific invoices, such as supplier code numbers, to answer 
queries themselves. As one SSU informant suggested: 
You can’t stop countries having direct contact to discuss a number of their issues…It’s difficult to 
have detailed conversations about an invoice that went totally ‘belly-up’ because we didn’t see it. 
We could see it on the IT infrastructure, we could get out the images, but there were no operational 
people here in the SSU doing this bit of work. (SSU Informant). 
Further, SSU members described that they did not have enough resources to mediate all communication 
exchanges. An SSU informant explained that thousands of invoices were sent from the BU, and the business’ 
suppliers, to the vendor to be processed. Many invoices required some clarification or additional handling 
due to exceptions, missing information, or mistakes. SSU informants suggest that they do not have enough 
staff or time to be able to handle all these calls themselves so had to connect vendor and BU teams.  
One way in which SSU teams connected information across teams was to standardize the invoicing 
processes across BUs making it easier for the vendor. According to informants, the idea was to better 
connect information so exchanges could be seen through formal infrastructure. The SSU team employed 
standard tools (such as common methods for collecting invoices, coding systems which could be applied to 
invoices systematically, and individual supplier codes to identify repeat suppliers) to make some 
information more readily available to teams and more visible to the SSU. In addition, the SSU provided the 
vendor with a contact matrix (a directory of contact details for people in BU and SSU teams) and 
instructions specifying who they should contact for what query. SSU informants suggested the idea was to 
enable the vendor to quickly access information but only from specific contacts. This allowed the SSU team 
to more easily identify information exchanges that they did not physically mediate. 
SSU teams also connected information by mediating relationships. Interviews with both BU and SSU teams 
revealed that BUs often avoided formal target review meetings with the vendor. One BU informant 
suggested “We don’t want to see them. We don’t even want to talk about them in the meetings”. According 
to BUs, they struggled to overcome language (or accent) barriers and cultural distances that made 
communicating difficult. For instance, BU informants suggested that the vendor were often too “sales 
orientated”, their presentations were “dull” and team members were “too defensive” of criticism. SSU 
informants also acknowledged the challenge: 
They want to look good. That’s obvious when they visit and also when we have these monthly 
management meetings. They just say “everything is fine. There’s no issue on our side.” (SSU 
informant) 
To connect teams, the SSU ran monthly Service Performance Reviews meetings (“SPRs”) in which the 
vendor, the SSU delivery managers, and the BUs met to discuss performance. According to the SSU, these 
meetings were also often used to share information between teams. For instance, teams often discussed 
changes that would impact on other teams and how they might implement changes across all teams. In 
addition, SSU members were present to monitor and capture the exchanges. One SSU manager explains: 
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We do want to have the links in our SPRs. It adds value because if we get a question on 
performance or something that just pops up that hasn’t been escalated the vendor can answer 
immediately. That very often leads to “Oh okay, we need to look into that process”. I also think it’s 
good that the BU sees that because sometimes they have an understanding in their head of what 
we should do and what the vendor should do.  (SSU Informant). 
SSU teams also used their intermediary role to promote their role connecting information. For instance, 
the SSU used their understanding of the requirements and preferences of individual BUs to implement new 
technology solutions. According to SSU informants they produced better reports than BU teams had 
previously had access to, reduced the number of hours BU teams need to spend on reports, and shared 
information and best practice between BUs. This was acknowledged by BU informants. For instance, one 
BU informant reported:  
From time to time I have direct contact with the vendor but then it’s basically just during the 
service performance reviews. The vendor take the lead in presenting the performance and the 
issues from the past month. The whole format was developed by the SSU. They know exactly what 
needs to be reviewed with us (BU Informant). 
Table 3. Summary of connecting behavior 
Role Connecting behaviour 
Connector 
 Make information more easily accessible to separate teams 
o Make information more visible through formal systems and tools 
o Make information more understandable through standardization 
 Encourage interaction between BU and vendor teams  
o Create a platform for open discussion  
o Encourage trust building 
o Encourage information sharing 
o Empower the vendor team to lead discussion 
How brokers protect information 
From the SSU’s perspective, information workarounds undermined the SSU’s ability to control the quality 
of information and make sure processes were being performed efficiently. According to SSU informants, 
BU teams used information workarounds to push through local adaptations (exceptions to standard 
operating procedures) and prioritize urgent invoices. SSU informants described that this was often at odds 
with the standard processes they had in place to manage invoices efficiently across Europe. SSU teams had 
to give equal priority to urgent requests from 22 other European BUs, as well as, avoid a build-up of regular 
invoices to meet their own process targets.  
We don’t want 10 CFOs to speak to the vendor and influence them. If you allow that the vendor 
starts to change processes to please one CFO, change the same process in another way for another 
CFO, and it will go in all directions. Plus, we cannot control that. (SSU Informant)  
SSU informants explained that adhoc requests for information, from BU teams to vendors, were often not 
supported with detailed instructions. Requests made in a hurry, over the telephone or via email, were often 
not followed up with clear and up-to-date instructions (standard operating procedures) for the vendor. 
Instructions gave the vendor specific direction on how to perform activities. From the SSU experience, 
instructions were an integral part of supporting the vendor to perform tasks accurately, to avoid 
misunderstandings between teams, and avoid errors in how activities were delivered and recorded. One 
SSU manager described a conversation between themselves and a vendor manager:   
We had a situation where I asked the vendor myself – ‘What is your instructions when you write 
an email to a business’ supplier for some information and you get an Out of Office?’. The vendor 
said ‘We send another email the next day’. I said, ‘But in the Out of Office it says they will be back 
next week?’. The vendor said, ‘then we have to escalate it’. So I asked the vendor, ‘If the Out of 
Office says “please contact Mr X or Mrs Y”, then why wouldn’t you just contact that person?’. The 
vendor said, ‘It’s not in the instructions’. Ok fair enough. It’s not in the instructions. So we wrote 
it in the instructions. We had to re-write them so many times. (SSU informant) 
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SSU informants also suggested that workarounds gave the vendor an opportunity to underperform. 
Vendor’s performance was measured against agreed contractual obligations (Service Level Agreements). 
For example, the vendor was obligated to process a specific number of invoices per day. However, according 
to the SSU informants, vendor teams often claimed that they missed targets because they had prioritized 
BU requests.  
The BUs put the vendor in a position to really take advantage of us. They say “Well, the country 
asked me to do this and now you’re telling me to do this.” We really have to manage the vendor. 
(SSU informant) 
SSU members were also concerned that issues dealt with locally were not being identified and fixed. One 
SSU member explains: 
If there’s an issue they just go ask the vendor to solve it but they do not look at the root cause. The 
people who should be involved are not involved (the SSU). The issue is ‘solved’ but then it comes 
over and over and over again. (SSU Informant). 
However, according to SSU informants, they did not have the influence over BUs to insist BU teams used 
formal communication channels. Instead, to protect information, SSU teams focused on pressuring the 
vendor teams not to oblige BU requests. SSU members described using formal contracts (e.g. SLAs) to re-
emphasis formal protocol and standard procedures. This included what the vendor’s role was, what 
information should be shared with the SSU, and what information should be shared with BU teams. 
SSU teams were also aware that they could not control information exchanges that were invisible to them. 
However, one way in which SSU teams protected information was to monitor for reoccurring problems. For 
instance, SSU informants described that backlogs and build-ups of unprocessed invoices indicated that 
invoices were being processed more slowly than expected. Reports supported by the SSU’s performance 
management team showed how many invoices ‘should’ be processed based on previous process rates and 
targets. Deviations from this amount signaled to the SSU to investigate. According to SSU informants, 
complaints or ‘escalations’ from BUs about poor quality or untimely invoice payments also signaled to the 
SSU to investigate. Specifically, SSU teams used ‘trackers’ and ‘logs’ to monitor issues and escalations. The 
team used these to identify reoccurring issues, investigate cause, investigate blame and seek long-term 
resolutions. SSU informants used “CAPA logs”, “Corrective action and preventative action” to identify, 
correct, and prevent issues from reoccurring. As one SSU explains: 
We review the instructions (SOPs) and discuss what works, what doesn’t work, and improve 
processes. We take the trackers to what the impacts were and see how we avoid this from 
happening again. We ask the vendor to do the same. If they’ve done something wrong we also see 
if they should have known better?  If so, they will have to put in a corrective action and preventive 
action. If it wasn’t captured in their instructions then it’s our job to fill the hole and improve them. 
(SSU informant) 
According to SSU informants, another important part of their role was protecting BUs from being over-run 
with calls from the vendor. Some BUs complained that calls were unnecessary and time consuming. From 
their perspective, BUs did not have resources to assist with vendor calls and queries. One BU informant 
suggests: 
We get infuriated if we get five calls in a month. That’s five too many. We should have zero because 
there is a control tower in place. I don’t care if the control tower or the SSU has outsourced to the 
vendor. As far as I’m concerned I’ve outsourced it to the SSU so that’s my contact point. (BU 
informant) 
Beyond their attempts to protect information that would reduce process efficiencies, the SSU team were 
also concerned that BUs questioned the SSU’s intermediary role. The SSU team described recruiting 
overqualified personal in the control tower team to actively interface between BU and vendor teams. The 
idea was that the control tower team “close down” communication from the vendor, re-emphasize formal 
job roles and responsibilities. In turn the control team focused on resolving issues before they reached the 
BU teams. 
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Table 4. Summary of protective behavior 
Role Protective behavior 
Protector 
 Guard the quality of information 
o Make instructions more thorough and clear 
o Discouraging adaptations to processes    
 Discourage interactions between BU and vendor  
o Limit BU influence on vendor by enforcing formal contracts and operating 
procedures with the vendor 
o Limit vendor calls to BU teams by explaining job roles and formal channels to 
the vendor 
 Monitor symptoms of the information workarounds  
o Monitor backlogs and build-ups of unprocessed invoices 
o Monitor complaints or ‘escalations’ from BU teams 
How brokers regulate information 
SSU teams adopted a flexible, pragmatic approach to information exchange. For instance, SSU informants 
described that it was often challenging to protect information at the same time as connecting information 
across teams and had to find a compromise. 
There is a clash between how much time we can spend on collecting data, how much we can ask 
the BUs to give us, and what information is available. It’s not terribly complex to deal with, but 
under the constraints that we have in terms of resources and time it becomes significant. (SSU 
informant) 
One way SSUs regulated information exchange was to be selective about when they enforced formal 
communication channels and procedures and when they enabled information to pass directly between 
teams. For instance, SSU managers made decisions about what information they considered ‘integral’ or 
‘high risk’. This was generally information that, if missing from formal information systems or had errors, 
would result in reoccurring problems and create more substantial errors in information (e.g. financial 
documents) or those that would directly impact the BU teams. For instance, SSU managers protected coding 
files. Coding files were created jointly by the BU and SSU teams, were maintained by the SSU teams, and 
were used by the vendor to process invoices. Coding files included important information about business 
suppliers, account numbers, and where costs should be allocated. This information was integral to wider 
accounting and financial processes such as balance sheets and profit and loss accounts. According to SSU 
informants, issues with coding files caused information workarounds to increase as teams needed more 
clarification from one another to complete invoice processes. For instance, coding files had missing supplier 
information, had double entries where one supplier had more than one code, or codes had not been updated 
to include changes in how costs should be allocated. To limit the threat, the SSU team reasserted the 
importance of their intermediation activities and encouraged teams to use formal systems to report coding 
errors. A control tower informant reported: 
Coding is a typical question that should not go directly. We have coding files, we need to update 
it, and we need to make sure BUs don’t get the same questions again. We will contact the vendor. 
We will contact to train the BU team. It could be caused by a change in the BU, in which case we 
might decide to set up a weekly call to discuss and take questions. Instead of getting many emails 
you can join once a week and we’ll consolidate the questions. Then we update the necessary 
trackers, coding for us etc. (SSU Informant). 
According to SSUs an important part of regulating information was also to understand the restrictions other 
teams faced. For instance, in performance review meetings (SPRs) SSU members encouraged the vendor to 
identify what information they needed (and did not have easy access to) and what challenges they faced 
completing their own work:   
We really have to play the two roles. When it’s about performance it is not grey – it’s good or it’s 
not good. Targets are there to be met. But when we talk about issues, improvements, and how to 
resolve them we are really working in partnerships. We have a lot of informal discussions with 
vendor managers (SSU Informant). 
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SSU teams also used SPRs to understand the challenges BU teams faced. For instance, SSU informants 
suggested that some BU teams get a particularly “hard time” from their management. According to SSU 
teams, they tried to accommodate preferences and resource limitations of different BUs. Some BUs did not 
want direct exchanges with the vendor, some only when necessary, and some took an active interest in 
building a relationship with them. One SSU informant described: 
The CFO of Belgium BU does not want the vendor on his calls. Then we really have to make sure 
they don’t get questions they should not get…Norway BU is very interested in supporting and 
contacting the vendors… UK BU does not want to get supplier escalations because the finance 
team there get the heat for it if invoices aren’t paid on time. Their business does not get angry at 
the vendor, they get angry at the local finance team. (SSU Informant). 
According to SSU informants, SSU members let some information workarounds happen by connecting 
teams but stepped in when workarounds became a problem. For example, if they felt ‘too much’ information 
was being shared between teams, if they felt information being shared was “too important”, or if 
communication was perceived by BUs as ‘too often’. One SSU manage in the control team described: 
We do want to have the conversations going. It’s not a bad thing. I believe you should be able to 
go directly to who has the answer if it’s set up that way. If it gets too much then we will get an 
escalation from the BU. For Denmark BU, which is a small country, we now have an escalation. 
It’s our responsibility to make sure the BU knows our role. We close conversations down again 
and explain the roles. That needs to be re-explained at least once a year because it changes. We 
have new tools so there’s always change. Denmark will be fine for a while but if the vendor has 
somebody new then it will happen again. We go in circles. (SSU Informant). 
However, SSU members worry that the ‘profile’ of some of their team were not able to handle this more 
flexible role. SSU managers hired over qualified or over experienced personnel to work in the control tower 
to broker information effectively. According to SSU informants this included the ability to negotiate and 
liaise with managerial roles. The control tower was tasked with making informed decisions about when to 
protect information integrity and when to connect teams to encourage direct exchanges. One SSU manager 
described how the control tower was developed:  
When we outsourced we thought we just need to track information and communication. But we 
realized that the person also needs to be strong enough to talk to the BUs, to communicate well, 
and to talk to the vendor.  The people who do the best are the ones who think. They talk to the 
technical guys, they ask questions to follow-up, they talk to the BUs. They only go back to the BU 
after they know the solution. We’re looking really for somebody who’s proactive, who’s not afraid 
to give the feedback to Vendor, who’s not afraid to dig, flags the issue, and think with the process. 
(SSU Informant). 
Table 5. Summary of regulatory behavior 
Role Regulatory Behavior 
Regulator 
 Be selective about when to protect information and when to protect information 
o Decide what information is integral to protect 
o Discuss and negotiate the priorities of other teams 
 React to symptoms of workarounds by increasing protective behavior 
 React to cause of workarounds by increasing connective behavior 
 Reflect on ability to regulate 
Discussion and implications 
Our research relates to a plethora of studies which have taken interest in explaining and resolving 
information exchange problems in GDW (Levina & Vaast 2008; Leonardi & Bailey 2008). Practical barriers 
such as geographic distances, language differences, and complex systems create distances between teams 
that can be hard to overcome.  In addition, less tangible hurdles such as knowledge differences, cultural 
divides and trust issues, can mean teams are less willing to try to overcome them. It has been a common 
observation in studies of GDW that intermediary units, such as bridging organizations, brokers, or 
gatekeepers, are an essential part of managing information exchange across disconnected groups (Burt 
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1992; Pawlowski & Robey 2004). Brokering perspectives in particular have pointed to intermediaries as an 
important conduit of information. In line with this, our analysis shows that intermediaries can indeed plug 
gaps between teams, mediate, and to some degree, control information exchange. Our findings concur that 
intermediaries play two important brokering roles:  
First, we support existing research which suggests that intermediaries broker by connecting teams and 
information (Currie & White 2012; Leonardi & Bailey 2013). The intermediary creates direct links between 
teams and encourage direct conversations by simplifying and standardizing otherwise complex and discrete 
systems. In doing so, information is more easily transferred and translated between teams. The 
intermediary creates a common language and avoids misunderstandings by creating a shared set of rules, 
procedures and channels for sharing information. The intermediary also provides the space for connecting 
teams to discuss reoccurring problems and find joint resolutions as well as sharing new ideas. For example, 
in our case the SSU created a physical forum (Service performance review meetings) where the vendor and 
BU teams came together regularly to discuss issues directly with one another. All teams agreed this was a 
valuable format for flagging information issues as well as creating understanding between the teams.   
Second, we support existing research which finds that intermediaries broker by protecting information 
(Mehta & Bharadwaj 2015). The intermediary, like many recognized in prior research, is accountable for 
the quality of information being shared between teams and, ultimately, the efficiency of processes relying 
on that information. Our findings suggest that, in the globally distributed context, the intermediary team 
focus on enforcing formal information channels, and reemphasizing specific job roles, to clarify the divides 
between teams. The intermediary created an interface to buffer and filter information being exchanged 
between teams. The intermediary also reverted to formal contracts and obligations to enforce formal 
communication channels. However, in addition to the two traditional roles identified by brokering research, 
our analysis revealed a third important role – the regulator (Illustrated in Figure 2.).  
Regulating workarounds 
Intermediaries, in performing their two roles, are designed to ease information exchanges between teams. 
However, paradoxically, we also find that the same intermediaries, playing the same connective and 
protective roles, can also make systems more complex to navigate and require teams to take additional steps 
to share and retrieve information. Past research has found that workarounds can be a symptom of complex 
systems and bureaucratic procedures. Under these circumstances, it is often the instinct of information 
users to find shorter, easier ways to get work done by going straight to the source (Cram & Gallupe 2016). 
Our analysis shows that teams bypass the intermediary unit and exchange information directly. From the 
teams’ perspective, workarounds enabled them to meet time-sensitive or urgent requests for information, 
or to prioritize local needs that were not being fully met by the intermediary.  
From the intermediary’s perspective, information workarounds caused issues for their ability to connect 
and protect information. The intermediary found that direct exchanges made crucial process information 
invisible to them. Issues were resolved locally and not investigated and corrected at a global level. This 
meant issues were often re-occurring and wide-spread across teams causing process inefficiencies. 
Information was also not being properly maintained or reported causing risks to information security (and 
in this case, financial reporting which has legal implications). However, our analysis gives interesting 
insights into the practical limitations of intermediaries brokering information. Intermediary teams were 
also aware that their ability to enforce formal protocol and 
communication channels were limited. First, the intermediary 
had limited resources to mediate all information exchange. 
Second, the intermediary had limited knowledge of specific 
processes to be able to assist all information exchange. Third, the 
intermediary was aware of the teams’ need for quick and flexible 
access to information that was being restricted by their 
mediation. Consequently, to some degree intermediaries were 
also reliant on information workarounds to relieve their 
workload and ensure information flows efficiency between 
teams.     
Consequently, the intermediary takes on a third role: Regulator. 
Findings suggest that unlike protecting and connecting roles, 
Regulator 
Connector Protector 
Figure 2. Illustration of 
regulatory behaviour. 
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which each required stability and predictability of information exchange, the third role required the 
intermediary to be flexible, reasonable, and reactive to changing information requirements. For instance, 
the intermediary made decisions about whether to connect or protect depending on the (changing) 
preferences of the teams they were working with. The intermediary made decisions about how much direct 
communication they will accommodate before escalations are made. The intermediary were also selective 
about what information they should protect and what information can pass directly between teams. The 
intermediary was realistic about exchanges they had the knowledge to support. In order to broker 
information effectively, the intermediary hired profiles capable of better judging ambiguous situations, 
dealing with difficult stakeholders and negotiating outcomes. Analysis supports the idea that in reality, 
solutions to complex problems are defined or at least adjusted ‘ex-ante’. Instead, intermediaries regulate 
information by making alterations, adjustments and personnel changes to cope with emerging information 
needs. 
Theoretical Contributions 
Our paper makes significant theoretical contribution to information exchange literature by drawing 
attention to information visibility. Prior exchange literature has often taken for granted the ability of 
intermediaries to find and access information (e.g. Ancona & Caldwell 1992; Mehta & Bharadwaj 2015). For 
instance, Ancona & Caldwell describe how intermediaries connect information by scouting across 
disconnected teams and being an ambassador who translates meaning. The study assumes that the broker 
has a positional advantage to see information across silos. Consequently, research has not fully understood 
how intermediaries broker when information is invisible. Our workarounds approach addresses this 
important gap in our understanding and shows how intermediaries broker information across complex, 
distributed settings (Leonardi et al. 2016; Mehta & Bharadwaj 2015) that create conditions to distort and 
hide information. Further, we draw on data from two groups: those sharing and receiving information, and 
those mediating it to explain how, in practice, intermediaries have to negotiate information visibility. For 
instance, how much information they are able to collect and how much information users are willing to 
make visible.  
Our workarounds approach, also contributes to a small but growing body of research which aims to 
understand how brokers broker (Quintane & Carnabuci 2016). In line with existing research we confirm 
that brokers play two integral roles: connecting information and protecting information. For instance, 
research has found that brokers connect information and ideas across otherwise disconnected groups (Burt 
1992) using work digitalization and social networks (Leonardi & Bailey 2017). Research has also found that 
brokers protect information by guarding and filtering what information is exchanged across organizations 
(Mehta & Bharadwaj 2015; Quintane & Carnabuci 2016). However, in light of workarounds, we contribute 
a new, third role: regulating information. Our research suggests that intermediaries are often not able to 
perform both roles simultaneously, as prior literature has set out. Instead intermediaries face limitations 
and have to make decisions about when to connect and when to protect information. Our complimentary 
third role builds on current understanding of how intermediaries broker information under complex or 
ambiguous circumstances which demand a more flexible approach to brokering. In doing so we contribute 
to understanding understand the role of flexibility and creative adaptation in inter-organizational 
collaborations (Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak 2016; Ravishankar 2013). In public policy contexts, Ravishankar 
finds that complex questions are answered through willingness to experiment, take initiative, and the 
flexibility to adapt with new challenges (2013). Our research builds on these ideas to show how information 
brokers take a pragmatic approach to workarounds and make context driven decisions. 
Further, brokering research has focused on the structural and positional resources of brokers as they 
influence information exchange. For instance, research has shown how intermediary units are a structural 
tool for positional advantage (Burt 1992; Leonardi & Bailey 2017). However, in line with Wang (2015) and 
Quintane & Carnabuci (2016) we find that positional advantage does not translate to brokering success. The 
theory and evidence we present advances a novel, pragmatic perspective on how brokers broker. We find 
that intermediaries are pragmatic about their ability to broker information. Despite their ‘positional 
advantage’ we find that brokers can only broker within their means. In doing so, we contribute to a scare, 
but growing body of research which reconciles structural (positional) virtues of brokers, with behavioral 
views of network brokerage (Quintane & Carnabuci 2016).  
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Third, our paper show the normative complexity of workarounds. Workarounds often perceived as 
negatively affecting the integrity and security of information (Azad & King 2011) or positively affecting the 
flow of information (Cram & Gallupe 2016). However our case demonstrates the wide range of affects 
workaround have, ranging from encouraging creativity and problem-solving, to hiding information, as well 
as, helping to mediate the flow of information between teams and compensate for limited resources of those 
managing information. We extend recent arguments that consider workarounds as paradoxical – both 
essential and harmful – and find that these impacts are contingent on how workarounds are regulated. We 
find that teams managing information take a pragmatic approach to workarounds by seeing them as 
inevitable and findings resourceful ways to work with them. In doing so, we show how workarounds can be 
managed once they become routinized (Rivard & Lapointe 2012; Malaurent & Avison 2016). 
Practical Contributions 
We contribute work on the evolution of shared services to explore the increasing demands put on subsidiary 
units and how they adapt to such pressures.  We support a growing body of subsidiary literature to show 
how, subsidiary units are increasingly becoming masters of their own destiny. Often, like our case Shared 
Service teams face resources and structural limitations which stagnate a unit’s ability to develop beyond its 
original cost function. That is, often Shared Service units are restrained by their functional remit - to drive 
down the cost of a function and increase efficiencies. Often this means subsidiary units received limited 
financial investment and have little decision making authority. It is not surprising then, that recent research 
has shown how subsidiary units are becoming increasingly resourceful and creative in how they move 
beyond cost saving to create value for the network and parent firms (Leonardi & Bailey 2017; Cavanagh et 
al. 2017). For instance Cavanagh et al (2017) show how subsidiary units develop their scope and value to 
the network by assuming more autonomy rather than being assigned autonomy by headquarters. We extend 
this by suggesting that SSU teams achieve this by taking a pragmatic and practical approach to their  
resource limitations, developing skills to see opportunities and develop their ability to ‘convince and 
persuade’ outside of official policy. We provide insights for those managing SSU and similar intermediary 
units by suggesting how one unit balances the competing demands of connection and protection through 
pragmatic decision making and adaptive behaviors. 
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